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Abstract 
Emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx ) contribute to formation of particulate matter 
and ozone, and also to acidification of the environment. The electricity sector is 
responsible for about 20% of NOx emissions in the United States, and the sector has been 
the target of both prescriptive (command-and-control) and flexible (cap-and-trade) 
approaches to regulation. We summarize the major NOx control policies affecting this 
sector, and provide some perspectives as to their effectiveness. While both prescriptive 
and flexible approaches continue to play an important role, significant new proposals 
have wholly embraced a cap-and-trade approach. 
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The Evolution of NOx Control Policy  
for Coal-Fired Power Plants in the United States 
Dallas Burtraw and David A. EvansΨ 
I. Introduction 
Emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) are precursors to secondary pollutants, 
including particulate matter and ozone, and contribute to nitrogen deposition and thus to 
environmental problems including acidification of ecosystems. Particulate matter is 
associated with both morbidity and mortality. Ozone has a widely recognized effect on 
human morbidity and potentially on mortality, although the latter effect is not firmly 
established. NOx is also associated with other environmental problems such as reduced 
visibility.  
Ozone is primarily a summertime problem, which is attributable to the 
photochemical process that leads to its formation. Both particulate matter and ozone 
pollution are widespread problems in the United States, and many metropolitan areas are 
not in compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for these 
pollutants.  
Like ozone and particulate matter, NOx is, due to its ubiquitous nature, also one of 
the six criteria air pollutants for which there are NAAQS standards. However, it could be 
thought of as the unregulated pollutant through the 1970s and 1980s, especially insofar as 
emissions from stationary sources because they were so loosely regulated until the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments. Nitrogen oxides are the only criteria pollutant that has 
increased nationally since 1970 (U.S. EPA, 2002a).  
The electricity sector is an important focus of NOx policies for two reasons. First, 
it contributes about 20% of NOx emissions in the United States. Second, these emissions 
are often emitted through tall stacks at high velocity, causing wide dispersion and 
contributing to regional pollution problems.  
                                                 
Ψ Dallas Burtraw is a senior fellow at RFF, and David Evans is a senior research assistant at RFF and a 
graduate student in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland. This research was 
supported by the National Center for Environmental Research (NCER) STAR Program of the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Smith-Richardson Foundation. The authors appreciate comments 
from Art Fraas and Thomas Sterner on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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This paper surveys the important NOx programs affecting the electricity sector. 
These programs have followed a path beginning with traditional command-and-control 
regulations leading to expanded use of flexible market-based approaches. Today both 
approaches play an important role. We provide a description of these programs and 
measures of their effectiveness. We pay particular attention to the effect of these policies 
on those coal-fired boilers subject to Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
(CAAA).  
II. Background 
This section provides an overview of 32 years of policy at the federal level 
affecting NOx emissions from coal-fired power plants. 
Traditional Command-and-Control Regulations and their Continued Importance 
Emissions of NOx from electricity generation had little binding regulation until 
the 1990s. The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act implemented performance 
standards for new sources, as well as those that undertake a major modification, based on 
emissions per unit of heat input. Collectively, these standards are known as New Source 
Performance Standards (NSPS). The new source standards were more specifically 
defined in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, and the standards for NOx were 
modified again in 1998. All new sources or existing sources that make major 
modifications built in areas that are in compliance with the ambient ozone standard set by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must prevent significant deterioration of air 
quality by installing the “best available control technology,” which is defined as the best 
technology considering energy, environmental, and economic impacts. Such sources in 
areas that are not in compliance with the air quality standards must install the 
theoretically more stringent “lowest achievable emissions reduction technology.” 
Additionally, these sources must also offset their pollution increases through reductions 
at existing sources. Thus there is an overlay of a regional emissions cap of sorts coupled 
with a specific technology standard in nonattainment areas.  
Existing sources were virtually exempt from NOx regulations until the 1990 
amendments to the Clean Air Act mandated a significant reduction in NOx emissions at 
existing electricity-generating facilities. While the contribution of NOx to particulate 
concentrations is usually identified as the most important impact of NOx on the 
environment (Burtraw et al., 1998), the regulatory handles for NOx emissions reductions 
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have stemmed primarily from concerns about acid rain and nonattainment of the NAAQS 
for ozone. 
Acid Rain Provision of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
The contribution of NOx emissions to acid rain was addressed for the first time in 
Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The most widely recognized focus of 
Title IV was emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) from existing electricity generating units, 
and the establishment of the emission allowance trading program for SO2. Yet Title IV 
also applied to existing sources of NOx a traditional prescriptive approach similar to the 
type used for new sources. The requirements specified emissions-rate limitations 
expected to correspond to specific abatement technologies, which typically meant 
combustion modifications such as low-NOx burners.  
Figure 1 illustrates the emissions of NOx from coal-fired boilers affected by Title 
IV, along with a measure of generation from electricity-dedicated coal-fired boilers, from 
1990 to 2001. The units affected by Title IV represented about 85% of total NOx 
emissions from the electricity sector. Over this period, NOx emissions from these sources 
fell by 26%, while electricity generation from coal-fired plants grew by about 16%. 
Although this picture provides no information about the efficient level of emissions or 
cost-effectiveness of the programs, it does illustrate that a reduction in emissions has 
been achieved over a period of increased utilization of coal-fired power plants and 
tremendous economic growth in general.  
 








































































































Figure 1. NOx emissions and electricity generation from coal-fired power plants. 
Sources: EIA, 2002, Table 8.2b; EPA, 2002b, Figure 11. 
 
These reductions were achieved using a two-phased strategy with different 
technology-based emissions rate standards for each major coal-fired boiler configuration. 
Phase I of the NOx reductions under Title IV was originally intended to begin in 1995, 
but litigation delayed the start until 1996. The first phase targeted 265 older coal-fired 
generating units and required tangentially fired coal boilers to meet an emissions limit of 
0.45 lb NOx per million Btu of heat input, and dry bottom wall-fired units to meet an 
emissions rate of 0.50 lb NOx per million Btu. Phase II, which took effect in 2000, 
required further rate reductions for Phase I units and required additional types of coal 
boilers to reduce emissions levels to rates between 0.40 and 0.86 lb per million Btu, 
depending upon the boiler type. 
In most cases, units affected by Phase I were retrofitted with low-NOx burners or 
similar modifications that control fuel and air mixing to limit NOx formation. However, a 
considerable amount of flexibility was introduced to insure that these requirements did 
not impose unreasonable targets. The annual basis for the rate standards introduced the 
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ability to average over hours in the year, providing much more flexibility in compliance 
than the hourly-based standard that characterizes new source standards. Second, firms 
were given the flexibility to average emissions among commonly owned and operated 
facilities. Third, the law allows a unit to obtain a waiver, called an alternative emissions 
limit, if it could not meet the performance standard even after installing the control 
expected to attain that standard. Further, if units exempted from Phase I chose to 
voluntarily meet Phase I standards by 1997, they were exempt from Phase II rate 
requirements until 2008.  
Ozone Policy 
In addition to acid rain, the second major regulatory handle for controlling NOx 
emissions has been the failure in many jurisdictions to attain the ambient ozone standard 
(NAAQS). In the period 1998 to 2000, 30 of the 98 regions that in 1991 were determined 
to be in nonattainment with the one-hour ozone standard continued to fail to meet the 
standard, and six additional areas fell into nonattainment since 1991.1 The EPA issued 
revised standards for ozone as well as particulate matter in 1997, and in 2001 the 
Supreme Court upheld the standards. The new ozone standard averages air quality 
measurements over eight-hour time blocks, increasing the difficulty of compliance with 
the ozone standard.2,3 If the new ozone standard had been in effect during 1998–2000, 
329 counties would have been found in nonattainment.  
The main sources of the precursor emissions of ozone—NOx and volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs)—are fossil fuel-fired electricity generating units, industrial boilers, 
and internal combustion engines. Before 1990, VOCs were indicted as the limiting type 
of emissions in the formation of ozone. This is often true in urban areas with high NOx 
emissions where there are not many trees, which are a source of VOCs. As a result, past 
                                                 
1 Currently, an area meets the current ozone NAAQS standard if the daily maximum one-hour average 
concentration measured by a continuous ambient air monitor does not exceed 0.12 ppm (parts per million) 
more than once per year, averaged over three consecutive years. 
2 Eight-hour averaging is more consistent with the health information that prompted EPA to propose 
revisions to the standard. Also, by averaging over eight hours, the standard helps protect people who spend 
a significant amount of time working or playing outdoors: a group that is particularly vulnerable to the 
effects of ozone. 
3 The classifications (status designations) of areas under the new ozone standard are expected to occur in 
2004. State Implementation Plans (SIPs) based on the new standard are due in 2007. To attain the eight-
hour standard, the three-year average of the fourth-highest daily maximum eight-hour average of 
continuous ambient air monitoring data over each year must not exceed 0.08 ppm. Areas are expected to 
achieve the standard by 2009, although it is possible to extend the attainment deadline until 2014. 
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efforts that focused on controlling ozone in urban areas emphasized VOC control. 
However, in areas with high VOC concentrations, such as rural regions with high 
biogenic emissions of VOCs, ozone production is NOx limited. When high NOx 
concentrations from cities (or power plant plumes) disperse in suburban/rural regions, 
they cause major ozone episodes. In fact, more recently it was determined that ozone 
concentrations reach their maximum levels outside of cities and have a regional 
characteristic (Mauzerall and Wang, 2001). 
In 1989, a federal scientific report suggested NOx controls as a “new direction” 
for the Clean Air Act and discussed the state of the science on VOC versus NOx controls 
at the time, which included model results for a half-dozen cities and from EPA’s 
Regional Oxidant Model for the Northeast (U.S. Congress, 1989). The results for urban 
areas were mixed, but studies in the late 1980s were fairly consistent in finding that 
reducing NOx would be more effective than reducing VOCs for rural and transported 
ozone. Chameides et al. (1988) and Trainer et al. (1987) offered convincing 
demonstrations of the need for NOx controls in areas with high biogenic VOC emissions. 
Recently, most science and policy analysts have recommended a strategy for achieving 
attainment of the ozone standard that focuses on reducing NOx emissions.  
Provisions to address nonattainment of the ozone standard are found in Title I of 
the 1990 CAAA. Title I required emission rate limits consistent with reasonable available 
control technology (RACT) for large point sources of both NOx and VOCs in 
nonattainment regions and the Ozone Transport Region (described below). These 
controls were to achieve a 15% reduction in 1990 levels of both of these ozone precursors 
by 1996. As such, this policy is referred to as the 15% rate-of-progress plan. EPA 
suggested RACT rates to states that were essentially the same as rates under Title IV for 
coal-fired boilers. Implementation of Title I came sooner and allowed firms less 
flexibility than Title IV. 
For regions that may not achieve the ozone standard even with the 15% rate-of-
progress rule, the 1990 CAAA provides a schedule for an acceptable rate of progress 
toward attainment. Beginning in 1997, these regions must achieve an average 3% annual 
reduction in NOx or VOC emissions, or a combination thereof, over every three 
continuous years until the standard is achieved. This policy, known as the 3% rate-of-
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progress rule, applies to summertime emissions in some regions while in others it applies 
annually.4   
However, atmospheric modeling demonstrates that precursor emissions from 
sources outside the boundary of nonattainment areas, in particular NOx emissions from 
large, rural, fossil-fuel-fired power plants, has a great effect on ozone concentrations in 
urban areas. Indeed, many jurisdictions found that they would not be in compliance with 
the ozone standard even if their own emissions were reduced to zero.  
Interstate Atmospheric Transport of Air Pollution  
To address interstate transport of air pollution, one major element of the 1990 
CAAA was the creation of the northeastern Ozone Transport Region (OTR) and its 
associated Commission (OTC).5 The role of the Commission is to promote cooperation 
among the member states in ozone abatement strategies. In 1994 the states, with the 
exception of Virginia, signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a coordinated 
three-phase effort to reduce NOx from large stationary sources, primarily electric utility 
and large industrial boilers.6 Annual control requirements mandated by the 15% rate-of-
progress requirement (RACT rules) were viewed in the memorandum as Phase I of the 
plan.7 Unlike most of the country, where the tightening of NOx RACT standards was only 
required in regions of nonattainment with the ambient ozone standard, the states in the 
Ozone Transport Region were required to submit RACT plans for the entire state. These 
control requirements became effective in the Ozone Transport Region between 1993 and 
1995. However, the memorandum anticipated that these requirements would not be 
sufficient to bring the region into attainment with the ozone standard. 
                                                 
4 An important caveat to the 15% rate-of-progress rule was that a state did not need to reduce NOx in the 
nonattainment region if it demonstrated that those reductions would result in an increase in ozone 
concentrations. In some circumstances where VOCs are the limiting precursor to ozone formation, 
additional NOx will lead to a reduction in ozone. This phenomenon, known as “NOx scavenging of ozone,” 
typically happens only within 50 miles of an emissions source. At least 12 waivers were granted based on 
this provision. Occasionally, where NOx abatement from sources in nonattainment regions was seen as 
undesirable, the burden for ozone control would fall upon VOC regulation under the 3% rate-of-progress. 
However, a strict focus on VOC control is an extremely burdensome way to achieve compliance. 
5 The OTR comprises 11 northeastern and mid-Atlantic states stretching from Maryland to Maine, plus the 
District of Columbia and the northern counties of Virginia.  
6 The program includes all fossil fuel-fired boilers with a 250 million Btu/hour or greater maximum rated 
heat input capacity and all electricity-generating facilities with a rated output of 15 MW or more. 
7 In New England states, RACT is defined as category-wide emissions rate limitations or control 
technology requirements. In Pennsylvania, RACT is explicitly defined as the implementation of low-NOx 
burners. Throughout the New England region this technology was a common compliance strategy.  
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Introduction of Flexibility  
Phases II and III of the NOx abatement plan in the northeast are collectively 
referred to as the Ozone Transport Commission NOx Budget Program. These phases of 
the program establish emissions “budgets”, or caps on total allowable emissions, for the 
period when ozone is commonly a problem, May 1 through September 31.8 The Phase II 
seasonal NOx budget for the region, which applied in 1999 to 2002, is 219,000 tons (U.S. 
EPA 1997). In Phase III, scheduled to begin in May 2003, the summer allocation would 
be reduced further to 143,000 tons. These budgets represent a substantial reduction from 
the 490,000 tons of summer emissions in the region in the baseline year, 1990.  
Phases II and III employ a regional emissions cap-and-trade program among all 
affected sources. A cap-and-trade approach ensures that the regional budget is met while 
attempting to minimize the cost of meeting it. Unlike the Title IV provisions for NOx, 
where emissions are allowed to grow in tandem with economic growth, a key feature of 
the NOx budgets and the associated cap-and-trade program is that emissions are fixed and 
it is the emissions allowance price that fluctuates. 
Unlike the SO2 trading program that is administered at the federal level, the cap-
and-trade program in the Ozone Transport Region required a high level of coordination 
among state rules to implement it. To move this process along, a model rule was 
developed that identified key elements that should be consistent among the participating 
states’ regulations.9 These regulations were then to be included in each state’s 
implementation plan (SIP) submitted to EPA. Experience with the trading program is 
described below.  
Trading in the NOx SIP Call Region 
The Ozone Transport Region in the Northeast is a subset of the larger eastern U.S. 
region that is subject to substantial transboundary drift of NOx. Because the states in this 
larger region were concerned that they could not achieve the one-hour ozone NAAQS 
without a coordinated effort, they participated along with EPA in a structured process 
known as the Ozone Transport Assessment Group to study the issue. The goal of the 
process was to develop consensus among the states for a coordinated effort to reduce 
                                                 
8 The NOx budget for the entire OTR is calculated by applying emissions reduction factors to each source. 
Each state has discretion in allocating its share of the NOx budget to its respective sources of emissions. 
Note that sources that do not fit these criteria may voluntarily participate in the program. 
9 Environmental Science Services (1996). 
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ground-level ozone in the eastern United States.  The Group’s final report was released  
in June 1997 and provided few actionable recommendations. For example, while there 
was considerable effort to promote an emissions trading program to control NOx 
emissions, no such recommendation materialized from the process (Keating and Farrell, 
1999). However, it did contribute to a consensus understanding of the problem at a 
regional level. 
EPA has the authority to require states to impose restrictions on sources of NOx 
emissions to assist downwind states in compliance with the ozone standard via Sec. 110 
of the 1990 Clean Air Act. In late 1997 EPA published a proposed rule relying on this 
statutory, and in 1998 EPA formalized the proposal. This rule is widely referred to as the 
“NOx SIP Call,” because it required states to submit revisions to their state 
implementation plans (SIPs) outlining their strategies for complying with state-level 
summertime NOx emissions budgets.10 The revisions were to be submitted by 1999 and to 
be effective by May 1, 2003. Although the rule allows states to develop their own 
strategies and rules for reducing NOx emissions, participation in a regional cap-and-trade 
program similar to the Ozone Transport Region program has been strongly encouraged 
by EPA.11  
The NOx SIP Call originally targeted 22 states and the District of Columbia, 
where nearly 90% of the boilers covered in the Title IV program are located. After 
various court proceedings, the date for submitting revised SIPs was delayed until October 
2000, and the date for achieving the reductions was postponed until May 31, 2004.12,13 
                                                 
10 While Sec. 110 of the 1990 CAAA allows the EPA administrator to determine a need for controls on 
upwind sources to ensure attainment of the ozone NAAQS in downwind states, Sec. 126 of the act allows 
states to petition the administrator to require controls on these sources. In August 1997 eight northeastern 
states (joined by three other states in 1999) filed petitions under Sec. 126 requesting that EPA address 
emissions from these upwind sources. On April 30, 1999, EPA accepted the validity of these requests and 
initiated the Sec. 126 Federal NOx Trading Program, which affects 13 states (a subset of the states affected 
by the NOx SIP Call). The Sec. 126 program remains outside the bounds of the SIP process and is thus fully 
implemented by the EPA (with allocations much like the SO2 trading program). However, it was agreed by 
the petitioners and EPA that the Sec. 126 program would be subsumed by the NOx SIP Call as the goals of 
the two programs are the same, provided that the SIP Call program survived legal challenge. 
11 The EPA program for the SIP region, when fully implemented, would subsume the smaller OTC 
program in the Northeast. 
12 The NOx SIP Call is designed for attainment with the new eight-hour ozone NAAQS promulgated by 
EPA in July 1997. However, on May 14, 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit (D.C. Circuit) ruled that the eight-hour standard for ozone was unenforceable. The court also 
granted a motion to stay the NOx SIP Call deadlines for state SIP submissions on May 25, 1999. 
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The courts also modified the SIP Call region so that, in the end, the region will 
encompass 19 states and the District of Columbia.14 States that participated in the Ozone 
Transport Region program began complying with the SIP Call on May 1, 2003, following 
their original plan of a third phase for that program. 
At the national level, the NOx SIP Call would lead to reductions of 22% from an 
annual baseline level of 5.4 million tons in 2007 to a new annual level of 4.25 million 
tons, according to EPA estimates. Summer-season emissions in 2007 would fall by 40% 
from 2.4 million tons to 1.45 million tons. In the SIP Call region, the program would lead 
to annual reductions of 34%, from projected baseline levels of 3.51 million tons to 2.33 
million tons in 2007. In the summer season, the program is expected to reduce emissions 
by 62%, from 1.5 million tons to 0.56 million tons.15 Most of these reductions will come 
from coal-fired power plants.  
Nationwide Trading as Part of the Multi-Pollutant Legislative Proposals 
The NOx program in the 19 eastern states and the District of Columbia comes at a 
time when calls for more drastic reductions of several pollutants are taking shape as part 
of a possible reauthorization of the Clean Air Act. In the 107
th Congress, three Senate 
bills proposed market-based approaches to regulating multiple pollutants. These 
legislative proposals seek reductions in emissions of SO2, carbon dioxide and mercury as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Without a schedule for NOx SIP Call in place, EPA separated action on the Sec. 126 petitions from the SIP 
Call on June 15, 1999. The Sec. 126 program thus became the basis for proceeding with the reductions 
required by the SIP Call program. However, as it became more certain through subsequent court action that 
the NOx SIP Call would proceed in generally the same form originally envisioned by EPA, the agency 
essentially amended the 126 program so that it could be subsumed by the SIP Call program.  
13 After 2004, the trading season will begin May 1 and continue through September 31. While the first year 
will have a shortened trading season, seasonal budgets (and thus NOx allowances) are unaffected. This 
allows an average emissions rate that is higher than in subsequent years. 
14 In March 2000, the Court of Appeals excluded Wisconsin from the program and raised questions about 
the inclusion of Georgia and Missouri. In August 2000, the court ruled that the compliance date would be 
May 2004.  
15 U.S. EPA 1998, Figure 2-4 and Table 2-4. The EPA baseline includes the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, but only RACT controls in the Ozone Transport Region. There are two reasons these 
numbers are approximate. One is that the reductions pertain to EPA’s original program that targeted 22 
states and the District of Columbia. The second is states have some latitude to change the portion of their 
emissions budget that is covered under the cap-and-trade program.  
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well as NOx from the electricity sector.16 An important difference in the bills is whether 
or not carbon dioxide is included. The electricity industry is already switching from coal 
or oil to natural gas as the preferred fuel for new generation facilities, and the proposals 
have implications for the rate at which that transition will continue. Emissions of all the 
mentioned pollutants are much greater from coal or oil than from gas; emissions of SO2 
and mercury are virtually zero for gas. Taken in isolation or as part of a moderate 
multiple pollutant proposal, the NOx emissions reductions under the SIP Call are 
expected to prompt the installation of post-combustion controls at coal-fired plants and 
many gas-fired facilities as the primary means of compliance. They are not expected to 
accelerate significantly the transition to natural gas. However, the inclusion of strict 
mercury reduction requirements, and especially the inclusion of carbon dioxide emissions 
targets, will accelerate a transition from coal to natural gas. 
III. The Performance of Prescriptive Approaches  
In this section, we analyze prescriptive regulations affecting investments at new 
power plants and major modifications to existing plants, and subsequently we review 
prescriptive regulations affecting existing sources. These regulations are usually 
characterized as an emissions rate-based standard that might be interpreted as a 
performance standard. However, in practice, these regulations often take the form of 
technology standards because the allowable emissions rates are usually written to 
correlate to a specific technology choice. Firms may have the latitude to deviate from a 
specific technology that is pre-approved by EPA or the state, but in doing so the firm 
assumes the burden of proof to demonstrate compliance, and that can be a difficult 
hurdle.17  
Prescriptive Regulation for New Investments: NSPS  
The New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) program constitutes traditional 
source-specific prescriptive regulation for new units and any existing units undertaking a 
                                                 
16 The Jeffords (I-VT) bill (S. 556) caps annual allocations of NOx emissions allowances at 25% of their 
1997 levels (about 1.5 million tons). The Bush administration’s “Clear Skies” proposal, sponsored by Sen. 
Smith (R-NH) as S. 2815 caps annual emissions of NOx at 2.1 million tons in 2008 and 1.7 million tons in 
2018. The Carper (D-DE) bill (S. 3135) caps annual emissions of NOx at 1.87 million tons in 2008 and 1.7 
million tons in 2012. 
17 However, it has become easier for firms to demonstrate the effectiveness of alternative control strategies 
due to continuous emission monitoring required by Title IV of the 1990 CAAA. 
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major modification. The first generation of the Standards followed the 1970 CAAA and 
applied to generating units that were constructed or modified between August 1971, and 
September 1978. The standards were modified in the CAAA of 1977, which were 
applicable from September 1978, until July 1997. The limits specified emissions per unit 
of heat input to the electric boiler, and they varied for plants based on the type of fuel 
used and, in the case of coal, the quality of the fuel. However, these standards were not 
constraining for most projects. In 1998, EPA issued new standards that were retroactive 
to 1997. These revised standards are fuel-neutral and based not on the ratio of emissions 
to heat input, but on emissions to electricity output.  
The levels of the Standards are summarized in Table 1. An important observation 
is that the current standards are neutral among fuels, which was not the case in earlier 
versions of the standards that were more lenient for coal generation than gas and oil. The 
current standard for new sources is 1.6 pounds of NOx per MWh, without regard to fuel 
type. Hence, this does not distinguish among fuels and also does not distinguish among 
the efficiency of the generation technology (heat rate) of different types of facilities. 
Along with existing combustion controls, the standard is expected to require some form 
of post-combustion control, typically selective catalytic reduction, at new steam boilers. 
The standard is estimated to result in a decrease in emissions of 26,000 tons in 2000, 
primarily from coal-fired electricity generating boilers, relative to the previous standard 
(63 FR 49450). 
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Table 1. New Source Performance Standards for NOx 
Affected Boilers  Standard (pounds NOx per million Btu)  Date for Compliance 
Units greater 
than 73 MW 
0.8 for lignite from North Dakota, South 
Dakota, or Montana; 0.7 for solid fossil 




than 73 MW 
0.8 for lignite from North Dakota, South 
Dakota, or Montana; 0.7 for solid fossil 
fuel; 0.6 for other lignite, bituminous, and 
anthracite and 65 percent NOx removal; 0.5 
for subbituminous and 65 percent for NOx 
removal; 0.3 for oil; 0.2 for gas; 0.3 for oil; 
0.2 for gas 
9/18/1978 
Units greater 
than 25 MW 
0.15 lbs./MMBtu for modified sources 
1.6 lbs/MWh for new sources 
7/9/1997 
Sources: EIA 1998; Krolewski and Mingst 2000.  
 
The New Source Performance Standards appear to have had an effect on the 
emissions rates from coal-fired power plants. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the percent of NOx 
emissions from coal plants, arrayed by vintages. In each figure, the vertical axis 
represents the emissions rates of the units, and clearly there is a reduction in emissions 
rates over vintage. The first three groups include units brought into service before 1970, 
and roughly correspond to the units built before the implementation of the 1971 
standards. The fourth group of plants, built in the 1970s, corresponds roughly to the 
original NSPS that were in effect between 1971 and 1978. The group of plants built after 
1980 corresponds roughly to those affected by the 1977 NSPS that took effect in late 
1978, and were in effect until 1997. The vertical bar to the far right of Figure 2 
corresponds to the group of plants affected by the standard that took effect in 1997. 
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Figure 2. NOx emissions and share of generation from coal-fired boilers. 
 
 
Figure 3. NOx emissions and share of capacity for coal-fired boilers. 
 
 
In Figure 2, the horizontal axis represents the share of 1999 generation by coal-
fired units. The graph is a histogram, with the areas within each rectangle representing 
the percent of all NOx emissions by these units. The average emissions rate of units built 
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before the New Source Performance Standards is about 6 lb NOx per MWh, dropping to 
5.37 in the 1970s, 4.09 in the 1980s, and 3.55 in the 1990s. Absent other considerations, 
if units built after 1970, approximately when new source standards came into being, had 
the same emissions rate as units built before 1970, their NOx emissions would increase by 
about 14%. 
In Figure 3, the horizontal axis represents the share of installed capacity. The 
areas in the rectangles represent relative potential emissions, but since units are utilized 
differently, this does not correspond directly to emissions actually observed in Figure 2. 
One can observe in comparing the two figures that older units have a somewhat larger 
share of capacity than generation, reflecting the fact that newer units operate for more 
hours due to their greater efficiency and reliability.  
Nonetheless, when the 1970 CAAA was written, the implicit assumption was that 
the power plant capital stock would turn over on a schedule that roughly approximated 
their book life (30 years). In fact, many older power plants have received extensive 
maintenance, as well as new electronics and other innovations, which have increased 
their lifetimes (Ellerman, 1998). The New Source Performance Standards have been 
ineffective at reaching these plants. New plants are subject to regulations for NOx and 
other pollutants that put them at a competitive disadvantage, at least as far as 
expenditures for pollution control. Many authors have argued that this has contributed to 
the extension of the lifetimes of existing plants, a result that is both uneconomic and 
harmful to the environment (Swift, 2000). Furthermore, although the assumption implicit 
in the NSPS was that it would be cheaper for new sources to reduce emissions, today it is 
often cheaper for existing sources to reduce pollution because of the strict standards 
applied to new sources. The cost per ton of NOx reduction at new sources is about $565 
for new coal, with the installation of selective catalytic reduction. The cost per ton at 
existing uncontrolled units ranges from $0 for cyclone units, to $161 for wall-fired units, 
to $631 for tangentially fired units (Swift, 2001).  
Prescriptive Regulations for Existing Units: OTR RACT and Title IV  
Ex ante, EPA projected annual NOx reductions during Phase I of the Title IV 
program of 0.6 million tons (ICF, 1990). The anticipated direct costs of achieving these 
NOx reductions are difficult to ferret out because they were combined with expected costs 
of SO2 reductions, but they appear to be about $100 million (ICF, 1990). By 1995, the 
abatement estimate was updated to reflect the expectation that only 0.5 million tons 
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would be reduced, because of changes in the expected baseline against which emissions 
reductions were measured (ICF, 1995). At that time, the average cost per ton of emissions 
reductions was expected to be $180.  
In Phase II, beginning in 2000, the annual emissions of NOx were expected to fall 
by 2–2.2 million tons compared to a baseline forecast in 1990 (ICF, 1990). Whether these 
emissions reductions were achieved depends again on one’s interpretation of the baseline 
against which emissions are measured.18  
NOx emissions in 2000 from all Title IV-affected sources totaled 5.1 million tons. 
This represents a 3 million ton reduction relative to the forecast 2000 baseline of 8.1 
million tons offered in EPA (2002b). Relative to 1990 NOx emissions, 2000 emissions 
from these sources are 23%, or 1.55 million tons, lower. If we limit our comparison to 
only those sources affected by the NOx provisions of Title IV (i.e., coal-fired units), 
emissions in 2000 were 4.48 million tons and only 19%, or 1.05 million tons, lower than 
in 1990. The smaller percentage reduction from facilities affected by NOx provisions of 
Title IV, which are only coal-fired, reflects the decline in oil-fired electricity generation. 
The reduction from NOx affected sources was not as great as expected due to reductions 
in electricity consumption, as noted, but also due to the compliance flexibility allowed by 
the NOx program. The number of units adopting each form of compliance (as described 
above) in Phase II is identified in Table 2. 
                                                 
18 Annual demand growth in the early and mid-1990s was forecast by ICF (1990) to be 0.005% greater 
than what actually occurred. Adjusting the forecast of emissions in the baseline to account for lower 
emissions would lead to a lower measure of emissions reductions. Later estimates adjusted for this lower 
growth rate. ICF (1996) estimates emissions reductions of 2.06 million tons in 2000, but assumes more 
stringent controls than ICF (1990), as a result of a lower baseline. Similarly, Burtraw et al. (1998) estimate 
emissions reductions of 1.97 million tons in 2000 (Phase II), based on the lower estimate of baseline 
emissions.  
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Table 2. 2001 Compliance strategies for Title IV (EPA, 2002b, Figure 14). 
    Compliance Option  Number of Units 
Standard Emissions Limitation  140 
Early Election  274 
Emissions Averaging  638 
Alternative Emissions Limitation  27 
 TOTAL  1,079 
The total does not equal the total number of 1,046 affected units because 28 units have both early 
election and emissions averaging compliance plans, and five units have both AELs and emissions 
averaging plans. 
We conjecture the cost of the program was lower than expected because many 
units avoided installation of low-NOx burners, the technology typically anticipated to 
achieve the standard, often due to the ample flexibility afforded by the multiple 
compliance options in the program. There also were more low-cost opportunities for 
abatement than originally anticipated. At units that complied in the standard way by 
achieving emissions rate reductions at the unit, the initial response to the regulation by 
plant operators was to optimize the operation of boilers by adjusting air/fuel mixtures and 
temperatures (Swift, 2001). Second, many units reduced emissions through operational 
modifications, sometimes called “trimming,” that typically reduce boiler temperature 
slightly, incurring a penalty in the “heat rate” of the facility, but resulting in lower NOx 
emissions.19 Optimization incurs almost no cost, and may result in savings, while 
operational modifications incur fuel costs. Of the 265 coal-fired units affected under 
Phase I, only 175 met the emissions rate limits through the installation of low-NOx 
burners, which involved greater capital costs as well as a slight heat rate penalty. 
Emissions averaging allowed 52 units to continue to operate above the average emissions 
limit. Overall, units lowered their average NOx emissions rates to 0.4 lb/million Btu, 
below the average rate of 0.7 lb/million Btu in 1990 (Swift, 2001).  
Cost and operation data available from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) Form 1 allow us to see the impact of both the RACT regulations 
                                                 
19 The heat rate is the amount of energy, usually measured as million BTU, required as an input in order to 
obtain a unit of electricity, usually measured as kilowatt-hours. The lower the heat rate, generally the more 
efficient is the facility . 
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required in the Ozone Transport Region and Phase I of Title IV of the 1990 CAAA. The 
plants represented in Figures 4 and 5 are those that can be tracked in the FERC Form 1 
every year in the sample period that contain boilers that must comply with Title IV of the 
CAAA. Plants with units that installed scrubbers to comply with the Title IV SO2 
provisions are removed from the sample. The plants are divided into two categories; 
those affected by the Ozone Transport Region (OTR) policies and those only affected by 
the Title IV provisions (nonOTR)20 Recall that the RACT rules are typically very similar 
to the unit-specific Title IV requirements, accept that they don’t allow the alternative 
compliance methods available in the Title IV program. 




















Figure 4 illustrates the effect on variable cost of trimming and combustion control 
modifications, such as the installation of low-NOx burners, which typically lowers plant 
efficiency and thus raises a plant’s heat rate. Although Title IV standards were 
established earlier, they were implemented later than similar standards in the Ozone 
Transport Region. Hence, one would expect to find an increase in the average heat rate in 
the region previous to similar increases at the national level. This is evident in Figure 4. 
Beginning in 1992 and continuing through 1995, when initial experimentation with 
                                                 
20 The sample is further limited to plants where generation from coal is at least 90% of total generation. 
The sample is about two-thirds of total coal-fired capacity in each case—the OTR sample and the Title IV 
sample not in the OTR. Some of the units in the Title IV sample are also subject RACT rules given their 
location in nonattainment regions, but this is likely a small number of facilities. 
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operating controls occurred in the Ozone Transport Region, corresponding to the 
introduction of RACT regulations. Figure 4 indicates that a similar increase in heat rates 
occurred in the remainder of the country in 1996 as Phase I of Title IV came into effect. 
The heat rate increase outside the Ozone Transport Region is dampened by the inclusion 
of units that are not affected by the Title IV provisions until Phase II. Nonetheless, one 
also sees an increase in the heat rate in the region in the first year of compliance.  
Also evident in Figure 4 is a period of learning, which corresponds with the 
learning process at individual facilities as the boiler operations were modified in a period 
of experimentation in the search for compliance strategies. By 1996, heat rates had 
stabilized at levels higher than those prior to Phase I of the program in the Ozone 
Transport Region, but well below levels during the initial years of compliance. One sees 
a similar decline after learning had occurred for the Title IV-affected sources in the 
remainder of the country. Inevitably, there was fleet-wide learning and, as companies 
took advantage of the ability to average emissions over commonly owned-units under 
Title IV, production moved from inefficient to efficient units.  
Modifications necessitated by RACT standards and the Title IV NOx program also 
imposed capital costs. Figure 5 tracks the average change in physical plant (equipment 
and structures) capital cost at coal-fired boilers affected by Title IV of the 1990 CAAA. 
Significant increases in new capital expenditures in the Ozone Transport Region coincide 
with the introduction of RACT performance standards for NOx in the region. These costs 
reflect the installation of low-NOx burners, but in addition a number of power plants in 
this region installed post-combustion controls. 
EIA (1998) reports that the cost of retrofitting a boiler with low-NOx burners is 
about 9.3–44/kW.21 A direct comparison between this cost and the changes in capital cost 
is difficult given that the signal in Figure 5 is confounded by the inclusion of 
expenditures not related to NOx controls. Also, there is more flexibility in Title IV than is 
allowed by the  RACT standards in the Ozone Transport Region, which would provide 
greater ability for firms to avoid capital costs. Nonetheless, the capital cost changes in 
Figure 5 are consistent with what would be expected from these policies. 
                                                 
21 The costs are reported in current dollar terms, but the exact year is not indicated. 
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IV. Flexible Regulation: Cap-and-Trade in the Ozone Transport Region  
Beginning in 1999, the second phase of the Ozone Transport Region achieved 
further reductions in summertime NOx emissions through a tightened cap on aggregate 
emissions coupled with trading of emissions allowances. In general, the trading program 
can be considered a success, especially when one considers that it was developed before 
many of the lessons of the Title IV SO2 program, the only trading program of similar 
scope, were realized. Trading between economically unrelated sources and across state 
lines has been robust, suggesting that trading provided an opportunity to realize cost 
savings. Enforcement has been very good. Between 1999 and 2001, only eight sources 
were in violation of their allowance holdings. Meanwhile, emissions reductions have 
exceeded targets, and the program also served as the model for the NOx SIP Call 
program.  
Although the Ozone Transport Region’s trading program can generally be 
considered a success, it got off to a rocky start.  This is evident in the wild price 
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allowance fluctuation in the first half of 1999. Figure 6 tracks the allowance prices of the 
different vintages of allowances in the program. 
Figure 6. 
 
Source: U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/noxmarket/pricetransfer.html, accessed December 2, 
2002 
The greatest source of uncertainty at this time can be attributed to the difficulty in 
achieving the coordination necessary to implement such a program (Krolewski and 
Mingst, 2000). This was manifested in the participant states finalizing their allocation and 
participation rules less than six months before the season began. For example, early 
reduction credits, which represented about 10% of the total number of allowances 
allocated in 1999, were not distributed until April and May. The rulemaking delay also 
raised questions about whether certain states would participate in the program at all. The 
most notable case in this regard is the state of Maryland, which in fact did not participate 
in the 1999 trading season.22,23 
Another source of uncertainty and market volatility resulted from the use of 
compliance strategies such as load shifting and trimming that did not rely on a significant 
number of retrofits. The cost and performance of retrofits could be fairly well anticipated 
by the market; the success of operational strategies was uncertain, but ultimately 
                                                 
22 The realization that Maryland would not participate in the first season eventually resulted in downward 
pressure on the allowance price, as Maryland sources were expected to be net-demanders of allowances 
(Farrell, 2000). Maryland’s participation was held up by a legal challenge from two utilities. Maryland 
signed a consent decree with the utilities that outlined their phased in participation, which started in 2000. 
23 Maine and Vermont, which were already in compliance with the ozone standard (U.S. EPA, 2002c) and, 
along with D.C., have few sources that would have been subject to the program (Farrell, 2000), never 
participated in the trading program. Virginia was never expected to participate in the program as it was not 
a signator of the agreement that established it. 
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exceeded expectations (Farrell, 2000). Once these uncertainties were resolved, prices 
dropped dramatically as it was realized that there would be sufficient allowances to cover 
emissions, even to the extent that a substantial number would be banked. 
Although there was considerable heterogeneity in the state laws and/or regulations 
implementing the trading program (even with a generally agreed upon model rule), this 
dimension of the program seemed to have little affect on how it functioned. In part this 
was because the heterogeneity is found in allowance allocation mechanisms and 
allowance set-asides, not in anything that would affect the compliance or trading process. 
States avoided implementing trading restrictions to micro-manage the allowance market 
(Rhode Island being the notable exception). It was the delayed implementation of state 
rules, and the difference in the timing of their ratification, that proved more of a problem 
than the actual text of those rules. 
The program demonstrates promise for more decentralized multi-jurisdictional 
emissions trading programs. The final allocation for 1999 for the states that participated 
in the trading program was 218,738 tons, including 24,635 early reduction credits (U.S. 
EPA, 2000). This budget reflects a 54% reduction from the five-month summer 1990 
baseline of 417,444 tons for these states. Total emissions amounted to 174,843 tons, with 
the remainder being banked.24 
V. Costs of NOx Control under Cap-and-Trade 
The cap-and-trade approach is expected to result in substantial cost savings 
compared to a prescriptive approach that would achieve the same level of emissions 
overall. Farrell et al. (1999) use a deterministic, dynamic, mixed integer-programming 
model of the proposed allowance market in the Ozone Transport Region to predict a total 
Phase II (1999-2002) compliance cost of about $900 million (1996$). Unfortunately, no 
ex-post estimates of the total abatement cost of the program are available. However, we 
surmise that the total compliance cost was likely lower than this estimate. The Farrell et 
al. model does not allow for changes in dispatch and the option of reducing NOx through 
trimming. These compliance measures were evident and, in the case of trimming, 
surprisingly ubiquitous in the OTR’s trading program. 
                                                 
24 The trading program has a unique constraint on banking, called progressive flow control, which limits 
the number of allowances that can be withdrawn from a source’s allowance bank on a one-to–one basis 
when the aggregate bank totals more than 10% of annual allocations. The NOx SIP Call program also has 
this rule. 
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The Farrell et al. model also predicts a NOx allowance price of $1,331 in the first 
year of the trading program, rising to $1,718 by 2002 (1996$). Significant program 
uncertainty kept the allowance price above this range until the end of the first trading 
season. The subsequent downward movement in prices can be attributed to the 
unexpectedly large number of allowances banked in the first year of the program. As 
mentioned above, sources also realized that more low-cost abatement methods were 
available than initially anticipated (indeed, more allowances were banked the following 
season). In later years, the limitation on the number of banked allowances that could be 
converted into NOx SIP Call allowances also kept downward pressure on allowance 
prices in the market for the Ozone Transport Region’s program. 
Krupnick et al. (2000) examine the costs of NOx emissions reductions in an 
annual trading program in a larger region of 12 states and the District of Columbia, which 
represent the major sources of emissions in the eastern United States, and is intended to 
capture most of the emissions within the broader SIP Call region. They find emissions 
reduction targets can be met at roughly 50% cost savings under a trading program when 
there are no transaction costs, compared to a command-and-control approach. This 
provides a rare explicit analysis of the cost savings of trading for NOx.  
Burtraw et al. (2001) find that the seasonal NOx trading program for the 19-state 
region is expected to reduce annual emissions within the region from 3.45 million to 2.43 
million tons in 2008. The annual cost of post-combustion controls to achieve these 
reductions is expected to be $2,146 million (1997$). They predict the cost of emissions 
allowances—presumed equal to the marginal cost of adopting post-combustion controls 
per ton of NOx reduction—will be $3,401 (1997$). This compares to a marginal cost of 
$1,356 for a policy applied just within the northeast Ozone Transport Region.  
Although the SIP Call policy will incur important costs, it is not expected to have 
a large impact on electricity prices. Burtraw et al. forecast that the average price in the 
SIP Call region in 2008 will increase from $64.4/MWh to $65.1/MWh (1997$). The 
reason that the effect on price may be negligible has to do with how the cost of capacity 
is reflected in electricity price. These forecasts assume that the current pattern of 
electricity regulation continues into the future. The authors assume slightly more than 
half the generation in the SIP Call region remains in areas characterized by regulated 
pricing, under which capital and variable costs are annualized and spread over total sales 
to calculate the price of electricity. In these areas, introducing a new environmental 
policy that increases the costs of electricity supply leads directly to an increase in the 
electricity price.  
  26Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Evans 
However, the other part of generation in the SIP Call region is in the market 
pricing areas where the electricity price is determined by the variable cost of the marginal 
generator plus the incremental capital cost of the marginal reserve unit. Policies that 
change the relative costs of facilities affect which facility is at the margin, which in turn 
affects prices and revenues earned by each facility, and thereby capacity investment and 
retirement. In these areas, introducing a new environmental policy that increases the costs 
of electricity supply may lead to an increase or decrease in the electricity price.  
The primary analysis of the expected cost of NOx reductions for EPA (1998) finds 
the average cost per ton of NOx emissions reduction achieved by the NOx SIP Call is 
$1,807; the study does not report an estimate of marginal cost.25 The change in prices in 
the EPA study (1998) is about 1.6% assuming marginal cost pricing throughout the 
electricity sector, and about 1.2% assuming average cost pricing. The EPA study does not 
clarify whether this applies to the SIP region or the nation. Burtraw et al. (2001) forecast 
a rise in prices in the SIP region, which combines average and marginal cost pricing, of 
about 1.1%. 
The estimates above are limited to compliance costs. The economic literature 
recognizes a broader definition of cost from environmental programs. The interaction of 
regulations with pre-existing regulations or taxes is expected to cause the social cost of 
new regulations to be higher than the measure of compliance cost in a partial equilibrium 
analysis. In a general equilibrium framework, the cost of new regulations act like 
additional taxes in the economy, and they magnify the distortions away from economic 
efficiency associated with pre-existing regulations or taxes.26  
Goulder et al. (1999) find that the social costs under a cap-and-trade program 
actually may be higher than under command-and-control.27 This can occur because the 
                                                 
25 The EPA baseline includes only RACT controls in the Ozone Transport Region, while Burtraw et al. 
includes the Region’s trading policy and its lower average emissions rates. Hence, there exist relatively 
low-cost abatement options in the EPA analysis that have already been included in the Burtraw et al. 
baseline. Also, Burtraw et al. assumes 8.7% greater generation in 2008 than does the EPA baseline (for 
2007). In addition, the emissions cap is 544,000 tons in the EPA study, but the cap is 444,300 in Burtraw et 
al. Subsequently, total reductions are 958,000 tons in the EPA study and 1,090,000 in Burtraw et al. The 
EPA study includes the original 22 eastern states plus the District of Columbia; the Burtraw et al. SIP 
region varies slightly. 
26 Williams (2002) demonstrates an important corollary that there also may be important hidden benefits 
within a general equilibrium framework due to the effect of pollution on the productivity of labor. 
27 Although this is an important possibility, the analysis does not account for the heterogeneity in 
generation technology (Burtraw and Cannon, 2000) and the way that electricity price is determined at the 
margin (Palmer et al., 2002). 
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opportunity cost reflected in permit costs might increase product prices to a greater 
degree than would a command-and-control policy. However, an important distinction 
between these policies is that a cap-and-trade program has the potential to generate 
revenues, which a command-and-control policy does not. An auction of emissions 
allowances can generate revenue that might be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary 
taxes, thereby offsetting much of the hidden costs. In neither the cap-and-trade program 
in the Ozone Transport Region or the SIP Call program are allowance auctions widely 
used.28 Rather, permits are almost always distributed at zero cost, so no revenue is 
available to reduce taxes. In any case, the approach to distributing emissions allowances 
is one of the important issues in the design of future emissions trading programs.  
VI. Conclusion 
Policy affecting NOx emissions from coal-fired power plants in the United States 
has evolved from prescriptive approaches to more flexible cap-and-trade approaches. 
Both approaches remain important today, but the future is likely to show an expanded 
role for the use of cap-and-trade.  
Prescriptive approaches include standards on new sources that can claim to have 
led to emissions reductions; however, the perverse bias against new sources associated 
with New Source Performance Standards is likely to have undermined the 
accomplishments of the program to some degree. A prescriptive approach also 
characterizes the first phase of the Ozone Transport Region and the Title IV NOx 
programs. These programs also can claim substantial emissions reductions, and their 
costs appear to be lower than anticipated. Although the Title IV program is prescriptive 
in nature, it nonetheless shows considerable flexibility through emissions averaging at 
commonly owned plants, alternative emissions limits, and so forth. To some degree, this 
may have undermined the effectiveness of the program because there is no cap to limit 
aggregate emissions.  
The cap-and-trade program that began in 1999 in the Ozone Transport Region 
provides the maximum flexibility, but it also provides the maximum effectiveness by 
capping emissions. That program also can claim significant emissions reductions, at costs 
that are low, compared to a command-and-control approach.  
                                                 
28 Only a couple states have considered an auction under these programs, and even then only for a small 
portion of allowances. 
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Both prescriptive policies and the cap-and-trade programs provide incentives to 
find low-cost ways to achieve reductions. Unlike the prescriptive policies, however, the 
cap-and-trade program provides an incentive to harvest low-cost emissions reductions at 
specific facilities even after the performance standard is achieved because those 
reductions can avoid investments at other facilities.  
The Future of NOx Policy for Power Plants 
Two issues pertaining to the future of NOx policy for power plants are in the 
forefront: extending NOx trading spatially and throughout the year, and reevaluating how 
emissions allowances are distributed in cap-and-trade programs. 
In the near term, NOx controls, currently limited to the five-month summer 
season, should be extended year-round. The ozone problem is limited to summertime, 
and this has been the regulatory handle for the cap-and-trade programs we have 
discussed. However, other problems associated with NOx occur throughout the year and, 
based on the public health and economics literature, are more serious than ozone. 
Particulate formation and its effect on health is especially important, from an economic 
perspective, and occurs year-round. Recent studies have shown hundreds of millions of 
dollars in annual net benefits (incremental benefits in excess of incremental costs) from 
extending the summertime NOx trading programs to a year-round program.29 The 
adoption of annual trading programs has already begun at the state level. New Hampshire 
adopted legislation that caps annual NOx emissions from its three largest plants starting in 
2006. In New York, proposed regulations would create a cap-and-trade program during 
the portion of the year outside the NOx SIP Call trading season.30 
In the long term, a critical issue in measuring the economic success of cap-and-
trade programs is the way in which emissions allowances are distributed. While there is 
                                                 
29 Burtraw et al. (2001) find net benefits to be about $400 million (1997$). Burtraw et al. (2002) conduct a 
sensitivity analysis and find that in 18 out of 18 scenarios, net benefits are positive, even in the western 
(upwind) coal producing states in the SIP Call region. 
30 Other states have adopted policies to reduce NOx emissions outside the ozone season, but they have not 
used a pure cap-and-trade program. Massachusetts has adopted stricter annual output-based performance 
standards for its largest generating units. In Connecticut, sources are subject to a stringent input-based 
performance standard. Both of these states allow emissions averaging across all sources in a facility similar 
to the averaging provision in the Title IV program. North Carolina has adopted legislation that, starting in 
2007, places annual NOx emissions caps on the two largest utilities in that state. The plants affected by this 
policy will not participate in the NOx SIP Call starting in 2007. The utilities agreed to these caps in 
exchange for a five-year rate freeze and accelerated depreciation of pollution control equipment.  
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evidence of cost savings from the cap-and-trade approach, this is limited to the measure 
of compliance cost. In a general equilibrium framework, the measure of the cost (and 
benefits) of environmental regulations will be greater than the measure of compliance 
cost, potentially to a significant degree. Unfortunately, the free distribution of emissions 
allowances precludes the possibility to use revenues from distributing allowances to 
reduce preexisting tax distortions in the economy that could reduce the costs of the 
program. How emissions allowances are distributed has large efficiency and 
distributional implications that were not widely appreciated in the design of previous 
programs, and will be central in the design of programs in the future. 
Meanwhile, the evolution to the next stage for NOx cap-and-trade policies is 
already underway. The trading program in the Ozone Transport Region, coupled with the 
success of the SO2 program, provides momentum for expansion of the cap-and-trade 
approach under the NOx SIP Call. In 2003, the NOx SIP Call will subsume the Ozone 
Transport Region trading program by significantly expanding the summertime trading 
program to 19 eastern states, thereby providing the second major experiment in emissions 
trading in the U.S. electricity industry. 
The long-run constraints on NOx emissions from the power sector may be 
tightened much further. As we have noted, a new wave of legislative proposals are aimed 
at further reducing NOx and other emissions from power plants and would expand the use 
of a cap-and-trade approach to achieve these emissions reductions, They would extend 
use of the cap-and-trade approach for NOx to the national level and to an annual basis.  
The potential long-run annual emissions levels under the SIP Call and the multi-
pollutant proposals are illustrated in Figure 7. The figure portrays expected emissions 
from the electricity sector in the year 2020 under various scenarios. The first bar is a 
business-as-usual scenario (BAU), reflecting a forecast of emissions levels that may have 
occurred in the absence of Title IV and other provisions of the Clean Air Act, such as the 
new particulate standard, which ultimately could force major emissions reductions 
independent of further legislation. The second bar shows annual emissions under Title IV 
and the Ozone Transport Region programs as of 2000. The third bar shows annual 
emissions when the SIP Call program is implemented. 
The next three bars represent forecasts for annual emissions under the leading 
three multi-pollutant proposals currently before Congress. The proximity of the long-run 
targets in these proposals is striking. Finally, at the right is an estimate of the efficient 
level for NOx emissions under a cost-effective regulatory policy such as emissions fees or 
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a cap-and-trade program coupled with an allowance auction. This estimate is the result of 
an integrated assessment linking the Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) model of 
atmospheric transport and health benefits from reduction in exposures to NOx and 
nitrates, but excluding ozone from reductions in NOx emissions, with a market model of 
the electricity sector. The bar indicates the 90% confidence interval around the mortality, 
morbidity, and valuation estimates in the benefits model (Banzhaf, et al., 2003).  
 



























































































Figure 7 illustrates that, if any of the multipollutant proposals on the table were to 
pass, emissions would fall within the range identified as efficient by benefit-cost analysis. 
All of these proposals would use a cap-and-trade approach, which is an important 
consideration. If the program were more expensive than modeled, perhaps because of 
hidden social costs associated with the tax interaction effect, because of technology 
standards implemented simultaneously, or because of interference in compliance 
planning by state utility regulators, then benefit-cost analysis would suggest a greater 
level of emissions as the efficient target.31 On the other hand, the exclusion of benefits 
from reducing ozone in the graph suggests benefits could be greater than illustrated. 
Both prescriptive and flexible approaches are likely to play important roles for 
NOx controls at power plants in the future. However, the sun is rising for flexible cap-
and-trade policies. At one time, a cap-and-trade approach was viewed by many as a sell-
out to business. Today, this approach is embraced across the political spectrum as an 
important strategy for achieving emissions reductions at less cost than prescriptive 
regulation.  
                                                 
31 The Jeffords bill would distribute a large fraction of allowances through an auction, but it would not 
yield revenues to the federal government that would be available to reduce taxes. The Clear Skies Initiative 
would distribute a small but growing share of allowances through a revenue-raising auction. 
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